@condorcet.vote/crypto-vote — test

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A — generate_identity_wasm()

Generates a random secret key and its corresponding public key.

Secret key (sk_…)

Public key (pk_…)

B — is_valid_prefixed_secret_key_wasm(prefixed)

Secret key (sk_…)

C — derive_public_key_wasm(secretBytes)

Secret key (sk_…)

D — sign_vote_str_wasm(secretBytes, vote, electionId, ring)

Secret key (sk_…) — voter must be in the ring Vote (string) Election ID (string) Ring — one public key (hex) per line (min 2 members; voter's public key must be included) Signature (hex)

Key image (hex)

E — verify_vote_str_wasm(vote, electionId, signatureHex, keyImageHex, ring)

Vote (string) Election ID Signature (hex) Key image (hex) Ring — one public key (hex) per line

F — generate_nonce_wasm() + prove_ownership_wasm(secretBytes, electionId, nonce)

Proves the caller owns the key image for an election, bound to a fresh verifier nonce. The secret key never leaves the device; the proof reveals nothing about it. Sign a vote in step D first to get a matching key image for step G.

Nonce (nonce_…)

Secret key (sk_…) Election ID (string) Nonce (nonce_…) — from "Generate nonce" above, or the verifier Proof (own_…)

G — verify_ownership_wasm(publicKey, keyImage, electionId, nonce, proof)

Public-input only — anyone can run it. The key image comes from signing a vote (step D) for the same election; the nonce must be the one the prover used.

Public key (pk_…) Key image (ki_…) — from step D Election ID (string) Nonce (nonce_…) Proof (own_…)

H — Benchmark

Mesure les performances de génération d'identités, signature en anneau et vérification.

Nombre d'identités à générer Taille du JSON à signer (octets) Taille du ring (nombre de membres)